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Theconcept of taxable income which is widely accepted by economists is that
of total accretion (see e.g. Simons (1938, p.149) and Musgrave (1965, p.165)).
According to this concept, all accretions to wealth are included, in whatever form
or from whatever source they are received. As a matter of principle it isobvious
that accretion as an index of equality should be measured in real terms. The value
ofnet worth at the end of the period must be deflated in order to determine the
changein net worth. The application of this principle calls for the exclusion
from taxable income of capital gains that reflect an increase in the price level,
and for allowance for losses suffered from the holding of claims (such as money).
In favor of disregarding capital gains that do not reflect real income increases,
it has sometimes been argued that wage increases in inflationary times also reflect
gains that are not real and that, accordingly, comprehensive money incomeis an
appropriate tax base (Groves (1959)). In reply, it has been convincingly demonstrated
by Diamond (19714) that a comprehensive tax base woulddiscriminateagainst taxpayers
whose income has a sizeable profit component. The reason is that inflation affects
capital and labor incomes differently, resulting in a greater percentageincrease
in income from capital than from income from labor. He has further shown that a
deduction of the inflation rate times the value of assets will preserve the relative
contributions to the tax base of the two sources of income. Thus, equity consideration
calls for such an inflation—exclusion, to be available to all type of investment.
But there are obvious difficulties in providing exclusion to all assets, an example
being money holdings (cash). Since cash earns zero money income, the application
of an inflation deduction with full loss—offset would call for tax credits fr
holders of cash. The accounting and book keeping that would be involved 3eem—2—
prohibitive. Diamond has therefore suggested to provide an exclusion only, al]owing
no tax credits. However, the provision of an inflation—exclusion to some assets
only, introduces efficiency considerations into this issue. Thus, partial allowance
for inflation may lead to a waste of resources used to convert assets from those
without to those with such an exclusion provision. Given that application of the
principle with full loss offset to all assets is impracticable, we may therefore
wish to consider provision of only a partial inflation—exclusion to assets for which
it is feasible. The problem is examined in this paper by means of a simple model of
anticipated inflation, in which individuals may invest either in assets for which
full or partial inflation—exclusion is provided, or in cash, for which no loss
offset is allowed.
Among other Issues, we shall examine the short and long run effects of taxation
and of the provision of an inflation deduction on the rate of inflation and on the
level of savings.
We do not discuss the long—run optimum tax and deduction rates, because it turns
out that for a given tax revenue, these instruments are perfect substitutes, i.e.
their relative size does not affect the equilibrium configuration.
Our analysis leads us, however, to discuss the optimality of monetary policy
in the long—run. There seems to be a remarkable agreement among most writers (for
example, Phelps (1965), Samuelson (1968) and (1969), Friedman (1969)) that the
laissez faire system does not lead automatically to optimality of the quantity of
real balances. The argument is that the cost of holding money for the individual
is necessarily different from the cost to society. While the cost to the
individual is measured by the (money) rate of interest, the cost to society is
ordinarily assumed to be (practically) zero. The suggested recipe for optimality
is therefore to satiate the economy with money, i.e., to increase the quantity of
real balances to a point where their marginal utility (or product) is zero. In
an optimum the cost of holding money should be driven down to zero. Following—3—
Phelpswe call this situation "full liquidity".
It seems, however, that the foregoing reasoning has overlooked an important
point.Specifically, although there is no direct cost of providing nominal money
bills there may be an economic cost of providing the economy with real money balances.
This cost results from the fact that an increased quantity of real money can be
absorbed in the economy only throughthemarketmechanism, andthis may lead to
changes in the real part of the system. Thus, for example, if the quantity of
real balances increases, consumers may feel better off and increase their consumption
expenditures which will reduce the accumulation of physical capital. It is then
possible that the cost involved in the expansion of real money may outweigh the
gains before full liquidity is reached.
The model considered here is one of imperfect control, where the government
operates a relatively small number of basic instruments which are not capable of
eliminating the social cost of money. In analyzing this problem we shall assume that
the utility functions of the private and government sectors are identical and that
the difference between the two sectors (in off—steady state situations) arises from
better foresight on the part of the government. In particular, the private sector
will be assumed to behave according to (changing) "static—expectations", even under
dynamic conditions, while the government will be assumed to have a full evaluation
of the future.
In the foregoing model money cannot be made neutral in the short run because
of inadequacy of the instruments. We cannot, therefore, expect to have full
liquidity in the short run if the economy is off—steady—state. However, even under
steady—state conditions, money is not neutral except in the absence of imperfections
created by, say, taxes. In principle, there may be a stationary optimum (or optima)
where the optimum quantity of money is short of full liquidity because of the real
social cost of increasing real balances. We shall illustrate this by an example—'4—
whichis in itself not very realistic but is indicative of similar situations which
may arise under realistic conditions. In the foregoing example we shall assume
that the rate of monetary expansion is the only instrument available to thegoverrunerlt,
andthat theutility function is of the additive logarithmic form.
The upshot of the foregoing statements is that a policy offull liquidity is
not necessarily optimal in the short run or in the long run if there is imperfect
foresight and imperfect control in off—study state situations.—5—
2.The Model
2.1 The Individual's Optimum Conditions
We assume that the individuals in the economy can be represented by one
family. This family liveS forever and the number of its members (L) increases
by n per—cent per unit of time so that Lt =L0eflt.The utility function of
the representative unit is given by
-5t
(1) U = eu(ct,mt)dt
where c is physical consumption per—capita planned for time t and is
the amount of real balances per—capita at time t. The latter are related to
nominal balances (M) by
M
(2) m =
where is the expected price level of the physical good in terms of nominal
money. The instantaneous utility function, u( ),isassumed to have the
usual concavity properties of neo—classical production functions. In addition
we have a positive subjective discount rate .
Letw. and r be the expected real wage rate and real rate of interest
at time t. The money rate of interest (i) is related to the real rate of
P
interest by i. =rt
+ wherePt =isthe expected rate of change of
t
the price level.
The stock of capital per—capita (k) owned by the individuals is rented
to firmsandyields the money rate of interest i.—6—
The material wealth of the individuals is given by a =k+m.To this we
must add their human welath (h) which consists of the present value of the
wage stream. The latter is given by
S 8
_J'rd -$Pdx
(3) h =, wsee
uX x•
,weux
where u denotes the individual's planning time and where p =r—n.If
converges and pconverges to a positive constant (as along steady states)
then his well—defined. U
Finally, we add the present value of real government transfers (g) which
is given by the same expression as (3) with transfers at time s,
substituted for w5. Again if v converges to a constant, then g is
well—defined.
Denote the total wealth of the individual by y ,sothat y =a+ h + g U UU U U
Then feasibility of his consumption plan can be taken to mean that 0 for
all u along the plan horizon. Since a =pa —iin —c+ w + v u uu uu u u u
hph —w and gpg —v ,wehave UUU U U UU U
(1) py —(c +iin)py — UUU UUUUU U
where we use the fact that money does not earn any interest and it is subject
to a "depreciation" rate p. The value of total consumption, eC + im,
includes both ordinary consumption and consumption of services of liquid
assets. Solving (14) we obtain—7—
,gPds -g = e 10 —, c8e
ds)
for some initial date t =0.It follows that feasibility implies
U-rpu-tx
(6) y0 Jce dsfor all u 0
0
meaning that the present value of consumption for any u cannot exceed
initial wealth.
Denote the present value of consumption in (6) by z. We may assume
that I0. Since both c and m are non—negative we have c0. It
follows that z 0. Noting that z is bounded from above andnon—decreasing
we know that there exists =z(say). From (6), z y0. However, if
z <y0,
then it is obviously possible to construct an alternative feasible
consumption path which has more consumption than the original one over some
finite interval, and no less consumption elsewhere. Since U = >0, the
original path cannot be a candidate for an optimal one. We may thus define an
efficient program as one which satisfies z =y0,
i.e. a program which






meaningthat the present value of 'terminal' net worth is zero.—8—
The consumer's optimum problem is to maximize (1) subject to () and the
non—negativity conditions on y, c and m. Assuming an interior solution, the
Euler—Conditions for the optimal paths C,mand y aregivenby
u(c,m) m u U O) =1 u(c,m) u
CU U
, u(c,m)
'.9.' c u u= u(c,m) Pu
CU U




where Uc,u is the value of ucorresponding to the Euler—path at time u.
Combining (7) and (10) we obtain the transversality condition
-6u
(ii) lime u y =0
c,u u
which holds for any efficient path of y. It can be shown by standard methods
that a feasible path which satisfies (14),(8),(9) and (ii) is optimal, i.e.
it maximizes (i).
2.2. Static Expectations: Explicit Solutions
An explicit solution of the optimal path canbefound with the additional
assumption that the consumer expects all the exogeneous variables to remain
constant, i.e. static expectations,
(12) p=p, p=p, v=w, v=v (p=r—n>0, ir+p>0).-9-
The budget relation (6), which we have shown to hold with equality, is
now given by




is the initial real value of assets per—capita.
Assume further that the utility function u( )isof the additive—log
form
(19) u(c,m) =logc + log m.





(9')can be solved to yield c =c0e
.Substitutingthis solution
in (13), using (8'), we may solve for the demandforc0 and
w+r
(15) c0=(a0+—--)
______ w+r (i6) m =(1÷8)1(aO +
Notethat the money rate of interest, i, must be positive if in0 is to
be positive and finite. As expected, the demand functions (15) and(16) are
seen to have negative price and positive wealth derivatives.— 10—
2.3Macro Relations
The foregoing maximization takesplaceat an actual time t =0(to
distinguish from the individual's planning time denoted by u). By relating
the consumer's expectations to prevailing values of the exogeneous variables,
and the latter to the macro variables by means of an aggregate production
function and market equilibrium conditions, the dynamic path of the economy
can be traced.
The production function in the economy is of the neo—classical type and is
given by
(17) kt++ctf(kt), An+.i
where A is the sum of the rate of population growth and physical depreciation
(Ii).
Transfer payments to individuals are equal to the government's deficit,
Mt











wherePt is now the actual rate of price change,which implies instantaneous
adjustment of expectations or "warranted price expectations"1. Competitive




We assume that is positive for all t (which entails
rf' —> f'—A=p>0).This assumption is justified, as will be seen
below, along anyequilibriumpath.- 11
Using the relations a =k+m,v =Om,(15) and (19), we may express the




Interpreting (16)inmacro terms, and assuming that at each moment of time
the expectations about the instantaneous rate of price increase (p) are
determined so as to be consistent with momentary equilibrium, the condition for
instantaneous equilibrium in the money market is




We may solve (21) for andby substitution of' this solution and (20)
into equations (17) and (18) obtain the dynamic path of the economy for given
initial conditions (k0,m0) at t =0,and for any given function e, t E [O,oo].
2
The simplest case is to take as constant ,say,e. It turns out
that for such policy, there exists a unique steady—state of the system, with
k =m=0.Obviously, by (18), in steady—state p =0—n.It is interesting
to note that the system can be shown to be unstable for deviations from steady
state. A similar result has been obtained by Uzawa (1966) under somewhat
different assumptions,but also with instantaneous adjustment of expectations,
which seems to be the crucial assumption for this result.3
We shall now introduce Into the system an income tax and examine its
implications on individual behavior and on the equilibrium configuration.- 12
3. Income Taxation
3.1. EQuity and Efficiency Considerations
Since we assume that labor is supplied inelastically, we can concentrate
on the effects of taxation on the income from capital.
In the presence of a positive inflation rate, the shortcoming of a
comprehensive tax base applied to money income is that it results in a greater
percentage increase in taxable income from capital then from labor income.
This inequity provides an argiment for an adjustment for :kiflation of the return
to capital. Specifically, we shall consider an inflation exclusion, allowing a
deduction fromtaxableincome that depends on the inflation rate times the value
of capital assets.
Equity and efficiency considerations both call for the inflation exclusion
to be available for any type of investment. This is necessary in order to have
the net relative rates of return from various investments independent of the
inflation rate. There are, however, some obvious difficulties in applying the
inflation exclusion to all assets. The asset that raises the most obvious
difficulties is cash. Since cash yields zero monetary gains (although it
provides monetary benefits in the form of liquidity services), the application
of an inflation deduction on cash holdings would call for tax credits for
individuals holding cash. The non—taxation of liquidity benefits could be
removed, in principle, by including these Imputed benefits, equal (in equilibrium)
to the rate of return oi othe:aets times the amount of cash, in taxable
income. But the accounting and record keeping that would be involved seem
prohibitive.— 13—
Itis thus reasonable to consider an adjustment for inflation by means of
an exclusion only, allowingnotaxcreditfor the failure of cash to yield at
leastthe inflation rate. Allowing an inflation—adjustment only for some
assets and none for others clearly involves an ficiency loss, generated by
resourcesused to convert assets from those without to those with the inflation
exclusion. It may therefore be appropriate to provide only for partial adjustment
of those assets for which exclusion is available. We attempt here to evaluate
these considerations relating to the provision of an inflation adjustment, from
the point of view of the individual and from the point of view of society.
3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Suppose that taxable income is defined as the money return on the value of
capital minus a fraction cU 0) of the rate of inflation times the value
of capital. Taxable income per—unit of capital is thusI. —cp=r+(l—c)p.
A full inflation exclusion (c =1)means that only real income is taxable,
while no exclusion Cc =0)means that all nominal returns are taxable. Let
the tax rate be t0. For the individual, real after—tax return of a unit of
capital per capita is now given by
(22) p=—y where y=t(i—ep).
Accordingly, the opportunity cost of cash holdings is now i =i—
Theindividual's optimum conditions are given by (8')and.(9')with'andI
replacingp and 1, respectively. Assuming thattaxreceipts are
returned to the individual by lump—sum transfers, the budget constraint, (it),
remainsunchanged. Under the assumption of static expectations, the solutions_114
forc0 and m0 arefoundtobe:
(a +—)— (a +—) (15') =
—+ w+v—(y+6 w+v
0 p . 0 p i+i8
-p+) +W+V) =(y+6)(a + (16') ni0=
— (a0 1+18
The previous solutions (is) and (16) are seen to be special casesof (15')
and (i6') when y =0.
Using the relations a =k+mand v =Om,.nd assuming that the demand and
supply of money at any time t are equal,(21) becomes
(21') m = +6)8(k +
—kf' +
Om) m +—f— A
I +i8
Again, the previous solution, (21), is seen to be a special caseof (21')
when =0.Equation (21'), the condition for momentary equilibriumin the
money market, can be solved for the rateof price change,









3.3.Short—Run Effects of Monetary Expansion
In the short—run k and in are constant, and equilibrium is attained by
adjustment of the rate of inflation and consumption. Thus, given k and in,
the effect On it of an increase in 3 can be directly calculated from (23):
(2k) — 8(y+
>0 —(i+—(1—c)(1+Bx)t)(f'—A)
where a subscript denotes partial derivative with respect to this variable.
The short—run change in consumption due to an increase in 0 is found
from (20'):






These results are stated in the following:
Proposition 1.In the short—runs an increase in the rate of change of money
supply increases the rate of inflation and the level of consumption.
3.. Short—Run Effects of Taxation
Given k and in,the effects on it of an increase in T or c can






Anincrease in the tax rate creates a substitution effect in favor of'
the demand for real balances, (16'). In order to bring demand into equi'ibrium— i6—
withthe given supply of money, this increase generates an increase in the
(actual and expected) rate of inflation. An increase in the inflation—exclusion
rate has exactly the opposite effect:
Prqposition 2.In the short—run1 an increase in the income tax rate increases
and an increase in the inflation—exclusion rate decreasesthe rate of inflation.
Short—run changes in consumption due to an increase In Torc are
found by differentiating (20'), using (21'),
(28) =[Ci — r(l_c))TIT—r—p(i-.d]=
using(27)
=(f'—p+p1—cfl(x_]. m >0 —l—)(1+x
since x >1.Similarly,
(29) c = [p + (lT(l_c))7r] =
using(27)
- Tpx-llm -- iB-1-)(l+Bx)
0
We thus have:
Prqposltion 3.In the short—run, an increase in the income tax rate increases,
and an increase in the inflation—exclusion rate decreases, the level of
consumption.
Notice that the government's tax revenue is equal to yk =T(k—cp)k,so
that a constant k and a given revenue imply a constant y. Since only y— .17—
appearsIn the eciuillbritun equations (20') and (21'), we have:
Prposition 4.Changes in the tax rate and in the inflation—excusion rate




Inserting (20') and (21') into (17) and (i8), we obtain the dynamic




Equations (28) and (29) determine the dynamic path of the economy for
given initial conditions (k0,m0) at t =0,and with any arbitrary policies
(0,t,c), for t E[O,oQ].
Letus examine the steady—state properties of the model for constant




It can easily be shown that at T=E = 0,we have for 0:
f' —A—= 0,that is the 'Modified Golden Rule'path.6 Denote this path
by (k, me). From the individual's equilibrium condition (8'), it is seen
that on this path
( =(f—Ak)— 19—
Bydifferentiating (32) at t= £ = 0,using (20') and (23), we obtain:
xn ax6 mf" f—Ak 8 Zk_Ck=_ iim
(34)z = = — <0.
Sk = = — + =— [1—f(f_ k + +f"0
=—n=—.— . = (±—xk)>
m m 1+ ani
(1+8)m2
In the (k,m) plane, the slope of the curvedefinedby s( )= 0is thus positive:
— >0
The slope of the curve defined by z( )= 0depends on the sign of
We assume that the first term in Zk (31), is relatively small so that
Zk< 0.Under this assumption
(36) Iz0
- <0.
By(35)and (36),atT=c=0,if an equilibrium steady—state exists
then it is unique (Figure i).m*
s(k,m,O,T )= 0
s(k,m,6,0,O) =0
Now, by (32) and (28) Z=—c<0.Since z <0an increase in T
(aroundT=0)requires in order to keep z =0a decrease in m. By (32)
and (26), s= <0.Accordingly, since Sm >0,an increase in t
requiresan increase in m.
In Figure 1, the equilibrium steady—state with T> 0is denoted byk**
and m**, We may conclude that
Proposition 5.Insteady—state, an income tax reduces the capital labor
ratio but may increase or decrease the amount of real balances.
It is easy to see that an increase in the inflation—exclusion rate has



















5.The Optimal Monetary Policy
Thegovernment has several instruments —monetary(0) and fiscal('r and E)—
vhie:i.t;.rinYietoachieve certain goals. Let us assume first that there exists a
fixed positive taxc >0with a full inflation—exclusion c =1(for a given
taxrevenue,yk, we have seen that a substitution of Tfor€, does not
affect the equilibrium values), and that the government wants to choose 0 so
as to maximize the welfare of the individuals.
We may derive from (8'), (20') and (30) the modified steady—state
relation (33) in the presence of a tax
— 3(f—k)
(33) in - (l-T)T'-)+0-n
whichreduces to (33) when i= 0and k =k*.The graph of (33') for a
givenk (<k* as was shom above) is given in Figure 2. The reason for the
negativerelation is that in steady states an increase in 0 increases ,
which reduces the rate of return and consequentlythedemand for money. It
can alsobe seen that the economy may"produce"anyamowit ofin provided 0
is sufficiently close to —(l—T)(f'—J)+n.The question iswhether in these
circumstancesitis at all possible to have an optimal stationary state with
a finite in.
Giventhe dynamic equations (30) and (31), the government wants to determine
the time path of 0 so as to maximize the value of the utility integral (1)
giventhe Initial values of k0 and
Theeconomic meaningof the optimality conditions for the government's
program can be best explained by using the Maximum—Principle formulation. The— 22—
relevantimputed value of the ttnatlonal_incomett at each t is given by
(37) H=u((k,m,0,t,),m)+qz(k,m,0,i,c)+qs(k,m,0,t,)
where qand q are the undiscounted shadow prices of k and m, which
should be considered as continuous f'unctions of time. The first order conditions
for a maximum yield
(38) UCk++ q(z_5)+qs
=0
(39) Ucm+ u + qz ++ q.5(s_tS)=0
(IO) uc0+ q.z0 + =0
—s —s (ni) lime q kO; limeqm=O t- zt St
wheresubscripts denote partial derivatives. The first two equations are
concerned with the effects of k and m on H along the optimal path.
Along this path the gains and losses associated with a change in k or m
must exactly offset each other as stated in these equations. As for (LO), it
is the condition that it should be maximized with respect to the control
variable 9 at each moment of time. Indeed in our model we have
H00 =cu
<0for all t. Suppose that s0 and c9 are positive
(actually, c0 is positive,and s0 is positive around k*, when t=0).
Then a positive shadow price for money impJ4i.es> U. Thismeans that the
same physical un:Lt of our good has a higher value in investment than in
consumption. This paradox is resolved if we remember that the shift from c
to k cannot be accomplished directly but only through the instrument 0.
Now, if we reduce c through 0 it must involve additional loss via the
reduction of in.— 23—
Equations(38)_(140), together with the accumulation equations (30) and
(31), the "end—conditions" (l&i) and the initial values and in0 determine
the optimal time path for the economy. Because of the complexity of the system
we cannot analyze its time path by conventional graphical (or other) methods.
The most one can hope to do is to analyze the steady—state solution of the system.
We are now interested in examining whether there exists a steady—state,
with k =in== q=0,which satisfies the first order conditions for an
optimal path. From (30) we have the relationships z0 =_ce,Zm =
Zk
= — X—c.
From (31) we have S0 =in—
1T0m5 =_mink =_Jkin
Conditions (38)—RO) thus become
(2) (u_q)c + q (f'_A_ó)_q.Slrkm
=0
(13)(U_)+ U —qirm=0
(l1) (u_) + q5m —qir0m
=0
Assumingthatc =1we have = — (l—r)f"m,inn = — (1—T)(f'—U)—
and ir0m=
Bc0.
Equations (142)_(l1) can then be further simplified
(142') (u_q_Bq5)c + q1(f'—A—S) + q(l_t)f"m =0
(143')(u0__Bq5)C +u + q5((l—T)f'—ll) + 0—n) =0
(1114') (u__B5)c + q5m =0
We have seen, (25), that c0 > 0. Hence by (414') U — — 8q5< 0.
1 1 B
Substituting in 3 jtheexpressions for c, U =c
=
f—Akand u =
itcan be shown that for small tand a given k, (143') is a strictly
monotone, increasing relation between 0 andFigure 2
Thus, for given and k, equations (33') and (13') determine
unique pair (m**,O**). It remains to show that the system as a whole
consistent, I.e. that all variables can be determined siriultaneously.
can be demonstrated by numerical calculations which we have performed
particular examples.8
The important thing to note about the solution displayed in
that it is obtained for a finite m, which Implies positive Urn
spite of the fact that it is feasible to create any value of rn.




It should be noted that when t0,the present model does give
full liquidity (m ,with8 =—6)as the unique optimum stationary
solution. It seems therefore, that for the given expectations' structure,










solution.It is only with the additional "imperfection" created by the presence
of taxes, thata'non—bliss' solution becomes optimal. It wouldbeinteresting
to examine whether other expectation atructwes couldprovidefor such an optimum
even in the absence of taxes. In any case. we have demonstrated that in an
economy with "imperfections" of various kinds —dueto individuals' erroneous
expectations, taxes etc. —theoptimum policy may drive the economy to a
stationary state short of fullliquidity.— 26—
Footnotes
1. Note that static expectations imply generally, unfulfilledexpectations.
However, in steady states =p)the consumer will have perfect foresight.
2. The more ambitious target of choosing the function so as to maximize
the utility integral, has been examined by Liviatan and Sheshinski (1971).
3. Under the more general assumption of adaptive expectations, it can be
shown that for a sufficiently slow speed of adjustment, the system is
stable (instantaneous adjustment means, of course, an infinite speed of
adjustment).
These calculations can be deduced directly from the budget equation,
which (in real terms) is now given by
c + k + (wi-p )k + m + (n-f-p )m =(i—y)k + v + v uu u uu u U uU uuU
or
y =y —(c+Im UuuU UU
The net return on assets being whilethe implied consumption value
(liquidity) of a unit of real balances is
5. The necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a solution
to (21') is that < 1. This condition guarantees that the
i+i
denominator in (23) is positive.
6. Note that the steady—state level of capital per—capita, k*, is
independent of'0.Thus, monetary policy does not affect, in the long— 27—
run,thereal partofthe system. This dichotriy disappears once taxes
are introduced, as seen below.






+ +e (tçr'—)+o (f'—x+e —i(f'—))(1+) > f'—A'((f'—A+0)(l+B)—t(f'—p)) '((f'—A+0)—t(f'—j))(1+)+T(f'—U)
For y0, C9 ,andc9approaches from above. Since, by
c0 j—and,by(414')u— — 8q—(1+8);, we canseefrom (143')that
the relation between 0 andmis positive.
8. Available upon request frcn the author.— 28—
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